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COMMENT
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE REGULATION:
AN INEFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO A
NATIONAL PROBLEM
I. Introduction
The volume of solid waste, particularly in urban areas, is increasing
as a result of several factors including population growth, industrial
expansion, technological advances in the manufacture of consumer
products, and continued American affluence.' Both public health
and the environment are in jeopardy because disposal methods have
not kept pace with the accumulation of solid waste. 2 "Solid waste" is
defined as any garbage, refuse or other discarded material caused by
agriculture, commercial and industrial operations, and by community
activities.3  Stringent air and water pollution controls, which limit
1. Congress has concluded that population growth, industrial expansion, concen-
tration of the population in urban areas and technological advances in the methods of
manufacturing, packaging and marketing consumer products, have resulted in an
increase and change in the characteristics of the materials discarded by society.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978).
The improvements in the standard of living, with its emphasis on convenience,
have aggravated the disposal problem. Id. § 6901(a)(2). Americans annually dispose
of 71 billion cans, 38 billion bottles, 35 million tons of paper, 7.6 million television
sets and 7 million cars and trucks. Andersen, Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976: Closing the Gap, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 637 [hereinafter cited as Closing the
Gap] citing H.R. REP. No. 1319, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). Congress estimates
that the amount of solid waste generated each year is 3-4 billion tons with an
anticipated 8% annual increase based on current growth patterns. H.R. REP. No.
1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238,
6247.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2). See also Note, Garbage, The Police Power And The
Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 8 CAP. L. REV. 613 (1979).
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into the
waters, including ground waters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Congress has identified at
least seven significant dangers as a result of improper solid waste disposal. These
include: 1) fire hazards; 2) air pollution; 3) explosive gas migration; 4) surface and
ground water contamination; 5) disease transfer; 6) personal injury; and 7) aesthetic
blight. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238, 6275.
3. The term "solid waste" is defined as any garbage, refuse, sludge or other
discarded solid material, resulting from industrial, commercial, mining and agricul-
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the use of incineration and ocean dumping for disposal, 4 contribute to
the problems facing governmental bodies responsible for solid waste
management. 5 Although land has become the only practical method
of disposal because it is not extensively regulated,6 its effectiveness as a
receptacle has been weakened by the increased amount, changing
nature, and unplanned disposal of refuse. 7
This Comment focuses on the treatment and disposal of solid waste
on land, particularly the use of sanitary landfills. 8 Although waste
tural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid or
dissolved materials in domestic sewage or other materials which are sources of water
pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976). This Comment does not address the problems
relating to the disposal of hazardous wastes which include inorganic toxic metals,
chemicals, synthetic organics, flammables, explosives and radioactive materials. Id.
§ 6921. For a discussion of hazardous waste management problems see Closing the
Gap, supra note 1, at 635; Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy,
19 NAT'L RESOURCES J. 249 (1979); Rosbe, RCRA and the Regulation of Non-Haz-
ardous Solid Waste: Closing the Circle of Environmental Control, 35 Bus. LAW.
1519 (1980).
4. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11977 & Supp. 111978
& Supp. III 1979); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly known as the
"Clean Water Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. III
1979); Ocean Dumping, §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
5. All of these factors have presented communities with serious financial, manage-
ment, intergovernmental and technical problems in the disposal of solid waste. 42
U.S.C. § 6901(a)(3). The collection and disposal of solid waste traditionally has been
considered a local governmental function. See Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325
(1905); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905);
Silver v. Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 2d 134, 31 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Strub v. Deerfield, 19 Ill. 2d 401, 167 N.E.2d 178 (1960); Building Comm'r v. C & H
Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946); Board of Health v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688,
151 N.W. 672 (1915);Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d
241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957); Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309, 105 N.E. 548,
- N.Y.S. - (1914); Meyers v. Cornwall, 24 Misc. 2d 286, 192 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup.
Ct. 1959); V & H Equip. Rental Corp. v. Garfield Heights, - Ohio App. 2d -,
161 N.E.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1959); Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959);
42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
6. See Comment, Solid Waste Disposal By Means of Sanitary Landfill, 36 ALB. L.
REV. 632, 661-62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sanitary Landfill]; 42 U.S.C. §
6901(b)(3). Congress has found that although land is too valuable a resource to be
needlessly polluted by discarded materials, most solid waste disposal is on land in
open dumps and sanitary landfills. Id.§ 6901(b)(1). See also Closing the Gap, supra
note 1, at 635-36.
7. W. MARX, MAN AND His ENVIRONMENT: WASTE 29-31 (1971). Land was less
affected by waste than air and water, because it lacks the dispersive capabilities of
the air and the dilution qualities of water. There are two types of refuse: organic and
nondegradable. Organic refuse will eventually decompose but nondegradable refuse
does not decompose. Modern packaging has created nondegradable, non-returnable,
one-use products which are making an indelible impression on the environment.
8. Sanitary landfills have become a basic component of all solid waste manage-
ment systems. Frankel, Independent Contractor Profits From Disposal Operations, 5
WASTE AGE 90 (May-June 1974).
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materials have been disposed of by either sanitary landfills or open
dumps,9 recent federal and state legislation now prohibit the disposal
of refuse in open dumps. 10 Sanitary landfill operations minimize
environmental hazards by depositing refuse in a natural or man-made
depression, compacting it, and covering it with compacted earth or
other material. 1 They are considered to be an interim solution until
more efficient and environmentally safe methods become feasible. 12
Municipal and state governments prohibit extraterritorial solid
waste from disposal within their boundaries.13 Several states, in fact,
have enacted legislation banning any refuse collected in other states
from final disposition within their territorial limits. 14 These barriers
erected against interstate and intrastate solid waste disposal create
severe problems' 5 because many municipalities and states are forced
to export their refuse.16
9. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(1). The term "open dump" means a land disposal site at
which solid wastes are disposed of in a manner that does not protect the environ-
ment, are susceptible to open burning and are exposed to the elements, vectors and
scavengers. 40 C.F.R. § 241:101(m) (1979).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(3). See notes 91-98 infra and accompanying text. For pur-
poses of this Comment, the terms "refuse" and "solid waste" are used interchange-
ably.
11. Institute for Solid Waste of the American Pub. Works Ass'n, Municipal Refuse
Disposal 56 (3d ed. 1970). For a discussion of the mechanics of a sanitary landfill, see
Sanitary Landfill, supra note 6, at 632.
12. Congress recognized the substantial dangers to the environment and public
health that are posed by current methods of waste disposal. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2).
In 1976 Congress declared that alternatives to existing methods of land disposal must
be developed since many United States cities will be running out of suitable waste
disposal sites within five years unless immediate action is taken. Id. § 6901(b)(6). See
also Note, Garbage, The Police Power And The Commerce Clause: City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 8 CAP. L. REV. 613 (1979).
13. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Monroe-
Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d
78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980); Dutchess Sanitation Serv. Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51
N.Y.2d 670, 417 N.E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1980); Town of Glocester v. R.I.
Solid Waste Management Corp., __ R.I. __, 390 A.2d 348 (1978). The term
"municipality" includes a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other
public body created by or pursuant to state law, with responsibility for the planning
or administration of solid waste management. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (13).
Because municipalities are concerned with the dissipation of their irretrievable
land resources and the creation of a health hazard from the operation of a landfill, a
municipality's primary objective in enacting these embargos on solid waste is to
reduce the amount of waste by reserving the existing disposal capacity for local use.
Note, State Embargo of Solid Wastes: Impermissible Isolation or Rational Solution to
a Pressing Problem? 82 DICK. L. REV. 325, 333, 349 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Impermissible Isolation].
14. See notes 188-89 infra and accompanying text.
15. Closing the Gap, supra note 1, at 635-36.
16. See, e.g., Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. City of Philadelphia, 68
N.J. 451, 458-59, 348 A.2d 505, 509 (1975) (discussing the cities of Yonkers and
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This Comment examines the historical role that municipalities have
played in providing adequate methods for solid waste disposal, em-
phasizes the traditional methods of zoning and critiques the effective-
ness of municipal regulation. It reviews recent federal and state solid
waste management acts and analyzes the issue of preemption. First,
whether the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 17 preempts state solid waste disposal legislation, and second,
whether state legislation preempts municipal ordinances regulating
solid waste disposal. This Comment also discusses the constitutionality
of state and municipal waste bans. State statutes prohibiting interstate
waste disposal have been challenged as a violation of the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution.' 8 Municipal bans on the
intrastate disposal of solid waste may violate the commerce clause or
be an illegitimate exercise of a municipality's police power. In conclu-
sion, this Comment recommends more effective methods for states
and municipalities to pursue in solving the problems of solid waste
disposal.
II. Municipal Solid Waste Disposal
State and local governments, in executing their roles of administer-
ing law and furnishing public services, perform essential "governmen-
tal functions." ' 9 The collection and disposal of solid waste is a neces-
sary, essential and traditional governmental function generally
performed by municipalities. 20  Therefore, a municipality has exclu-
sive control over the disposal of solid waste and may impose any
reasonable regulation thereof.21
Philadelphia); Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978), af'd, 619 F.2d
871 (10th Cir. 1980) (discussing Texas); Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d 679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980) (dissent
discussing the city of Rochester); Dutchess Sanitary Serv., Inc. v. Town of Plattekill,
51 N.Y.2d 670, 417 N.E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1980) (discussing New Jersey and
Connecticut).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-87 (Supp. 1 1977).
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... to
regulate commerce ... among the several states .. "
19. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). A few examples of
essential or traditional governmental functions include fire prevention, police protec-
tion, sanitation, public health and parks and recreation. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
20. See cases cited in note 5 supra. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4); Institute For
Solid Waste of American Pub. Works Ass'n, Municipal Refuse Disposal 4 (3d ed.
1970).
21. Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309, 311, 318, 105 N.E. 548, 550 (1914). A
municipality may provide that refuse shall only be removed by the city itself, or a
private contractor hired by the city or by granting an individual an exclusive license
to remove the city's refuse.
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Courts have stated that the removal of solid waste is necessary for
the continued well-being and health of a community and neighboring
communities. 22 As a result, municipalities have both the power and a
duty to provide for the collection and disposal of waste.23
A. The Historical Background of Zoning Ordinances
Zoning was one of the first methods employed by municipalities to
regulate or prohibit refuse disposal within their boundaries.24  The
Supreme Court, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 25 held that the
authority to zone property is included within the state's police power
because zoning bears a rational relation to the health and safety of the
community. 26  Zoning, as an exercise of the state's police power, is
generally delegated by the states to administrative agencies and local
governments. 27 Formerly the several bases for a state's delegation of
the power to zone were home rule powers, 28 implied powers of state
constitutions, 2 and enabling legislation. 30  Currently, zoning en-
abling acts are used in all fifty states. 31
22. Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 194, 140 N.E.2d 241, 243,
159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (1957). See also Silver v. Los Angeles, 217 Cal. App. 2d 134,
31 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Strub v. Deerfield, 19 I1l. 2d 401, 167
N.E.2d 178 (1960); Building Comm'r v. C & H Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537
(1946); Board of Health v. Vink, 184 Mich. 688, 151 N.W. 672 (1915); Rochester v.
Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309, 105 N.E. 548 (1914); Meyers v. Cornwall, 24 Misc. 2d 286,
192 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1965); V & H Equip. Rental Corp. v. Garfield Heights,
- Ohio App. 2d -, 161 N.E.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1959); Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa. 576,
151 A.2d 108 (1959); Kunz v. City of Titusville, 373 Pa. 528, 97 A.2d 42 (1953).
23. Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 194-95, 140 N.E.2d 24.,
243, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (1957).
24. See Building Comm'r v. C & H Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946);
Municipal Refuse Disposal, supra note 11, at 63, 98.
25. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
26. Id. at 391.
27. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 76 (1971).
28. E.M. BASSETT, ZONING: THE LAWS, ADMINISTRATION AND COURT DECISIONS
DURING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS, reprinted in Metropolitan America 13, 14-15
(reprint ed. 1974). Ahome rule power is where a state constitution has empowered a
municipality with broad regulatory powers. An example of a state which has home
rule units is Illinois. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
29. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 77 (1971). Some states had laws generally autho-
rizing the exercise of the police power by local governments. A municipality's power
to zone was implied from these laws.
30. BASSErr, supra note 28, at 27. An enabling act for zoning is the grant of power
to municipalities to regulate the height, area, size, location and use of buildings and
the use of land. Id. Zoning enabling statutes set forth the purposes of zoning ordi-
nances and contain guidelines and standards for enacting and administering them,
including provisions for public protest. Bollinger v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va.
185, 227 S.E.2d 682 (1976).
31. R. ANDERSON AND B. RoswIG, PLANNING, ZONING AND SuB-DIvISION, SUMMARY
OF STATUTORY LAW OF THE 50 STATES 191 (1966) (summarizes the Enabling Act in all
states).
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These acts grant municipalities the power to regulate the height,
area, size, location, and use of buildings. 32 In addition, they set forth
categories for the use of land including commercial, industrial, resi-
dential, and agricultural uses. 33
Municipal zoning ordinances, in order to be a legitimate exercise of
the police power, must relate to the health, safety and welfare of the
community. 34 A municipal zoning ordinance that does not comply
with the applicable local ordinance will be held invalid. 35 For exam-
ple, the New York appellate division held that a town board had no
authority to deny a permit for the excavation of a landfill site because
the town board "did not have the power to deny the permit on
grounds not expressly stated in the ordinance. '" 3
Until recently, most municipalities disposed of their refuse in open
dumps creating public health hazards.3 7  Unfortunately, the terms
"dump" and "sanitary landfill" often are confused and used inter-
changeably by the public. 38 Consequently, there has been continuous
public protest concerning proposed locations of sanitary landfills39
based on the misconception that the burial of solid waste is a nuisance
per se 40 because it endangers public health and decreases the value of
adjoining property. However, courts have held that the establishment
and operation of a sanitary landfill is not a nuisance per se, but is in
fact a sensible solution to the problem of refuse disposal. 41 A sanitary
32. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING 80 (1971).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926); Township of
Vanport v. Brobeck, 22 Pa. Commw. 523, 349 A.2d 523, 524 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Case v. Knauf, 32 Misc. 2d 137, 224 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1961)
(holding that it is invalid for a town to grant a permit to operate a sanitary landfill
because the town's zoning ordinance permitted disposal of refuse only for the purpose
of establishing grades); Ench v. Mayor of Pequannock, 47 N.J. 535, 222 A.2d 1
(1966) (holding that a town resolution which granted the plaintiff a franchise to
build and operate a garbage incinerator was inconsistent with the Town's zoning
ordinance).
36. Chem-Trol Pollution Serv. v. Board of Appeals, 65 A.D.2d 178, 180, 411
N.Y.S. 2d 69, 72 (4th Dep't 1978).
37. Note, Problems Associated With The Management Of Solid Waste: Is There A
Solution In The Offing?, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Is There A Solution?]. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
38. See note 9 supra. Institute For Solid Wastes Of American Pub. Works Ass'n,
Municipal Refuse Disposal 93 (3d ed. 1970).
39. Id.
40. The term "nuisance per se" is defined as an act, occupation, or structure
which is a nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, regardless of the
location or surroundings. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (5th ed. 1979). (citations
omitted).
41. See, e.g., Kirk v. McTyeire, 209 Ala. 125, 95 So. 361, 362 (1923); Rocchi v.
Zoning Bd., 157 Conn. 106, 109, 248 A.2d 922, 924 (1968); Wood v. Town of
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landfill which is properly located, designed and efficiently operated,
eliminates or effectively controls the public health hazards associated
with an open dump. 42 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Rocchi v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 43 found that a sanitary landfill operation
serves the public welfare and convenience and does not permanently
or substantially injure neighboring property. 44
Zoning ordinances divide a municipality into districts based on
functional utilization, such as residential, agricultural, commercial or
industrial. 45  Conditional, permissible and prohibited uses are pro-
vided for within each zoned district. 46 In the absence of state pre-
emption, 47 municipalities are free to locate a waste disposal facility in
any district. 48  Generally, solid waste disposal is not expressly pro-
Wilton, 156 Conn. 304, 310, 240 A.2d 904, 907 (1968); Cullum v, Topps Stillman's
Inc., 1 Mich. App. 92, 97, 134 N.W.2d 349, 351 (1965); Sommers v. City of Detroit,
284 Mich. 67, 72-75, 278 N.W. 767, 769-70 (1938); Roberts v. Lower Merion Twp.,
333 Pa. 333, 335-36, 5 A.2d 10 (1939). Where a landfill becomes a nuisance in fact
through illegal or improper operation, however, courts may enjoin the nuisance and
award relief to neighboring residents. See, e.g., Brainard v. Town of West Hartford,
140 Conn. 631, 634, 103 A.2d 135, 137 (1954) (injunction granted to prohibit the
establishment of prospective dump in a residential area); Steifer v. City of Kansas
City, 175 Kan. 794, 798-800, 267 P.2d 474, 478-79 (1954) (city enjoined from
continuing to operate a dump); Horn v. Community Refuse Disposal, Inc., 186 Neb.
43, 45-46, 180 N.W.2d 691, 693 (1970) (court did not grant an injunction to prohibit
the establishment of a prospective dump where plaintiff did not meet the burden of
proof that a nuisance would be created); Webb v. Rye, 108 N.H. 147, 150-55, 230
A.2d 223, 226-30 (1967) (court found the operation of a dump and incinerator was a
nuisance but gave defendant town an opportunity to correct the problem because of
the public necessity for these facilities); Bloss v. Village of Canastota, 35 Misc. 2d
829, 833-35, 232 N.Y.S.2d 166, 171-72 (1962) (court would enjoin the continued
operation of a dump after the court had given defendant the opportunity to correct
the nuisance); Harris v. Skirving, 41 Wash. 2d 944, 248 P.2d 408 (1952). The term
"nuisance in fact" means any act, occupation or structure which is not a nuisance per
se but may become nuisances by reason of the circumstances of the location and
surroundings or manner in which it is performed or operated. BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 962 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
42. Municipal Refuse Disposal, supra note 38, at 63. See also Rocchi v. Zoning
Bd., 157 Conn. 106, 109, 248 A.2d 922, 924 (1968).
43. 157 Conn. 106, 248 A.2d 922 (1968).
44. Id. at 113-14, 248 A.2d at 926.
45. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING at 80-81.
46. Id.
47. See notes 126-66 infra and accompanying text.
48. City of Birmingham v. Scogin, 269 Ala. 679, -, 115 So.2d 505, 514 (1959)
(zoning did not apply to the operation of a governmental function by a municipality
and the operation of a garbage disposal area was held to be a discharge of a
governmental function); Pruett v. Dayton, 39 Del. Ch. 537, __, 168 A.2d 543, 544
(1961) (where a subdivision of a state government was not subject to its own zoning
regulation when it exercised a governmental function); Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd
Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 192, 140 N.E.2d 241, 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (1957)
(where a village was not subject to zoning restrictions in the performance of its
governmental activities).
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vided for in such zoning districts and is not considered a permissible
use in any district. 4  Instead, it is viewed as a conditional use, 5 1
requiring either a variance, 5' or a special 52 or conditional use per-
mit, 53 to operate within a municipality. These permits are not usually
granted within residential districts because the impact on the environ--
ment and community outweighs the public necessity for a landfill.
54
49. See, e.g., Citizens Against Lewis and Clark Landfill v. Pottawattamie County
Bd., 277 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1979); Vogelaar v. Polk County Zoning Bd., 188
N.W.2d 860 (Iowa 1971); Schultz v. Board of Adjustment, 258 Iowa 804, 139
N.W.2d 448 (1966); Zengerle v. Board of County Comm'rs., 262 Md. 1, 276 A.2d
646 (1971); Ench v. Mayor & Council of the Township of Pequannock, 47 N.J. 535,
222 A.2d 1 (1966); Case v. Knauf, 32 Misc. 2d 137, 224 N.Y.S. 228 (1961); Nehbras
v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957);
Greene Township v. Kuhl, 32 Pa. Commw. 592, 379 A.2d 1383 (1977); Bollinger v.
Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 185, 227 S.E.2d 682 (1976).
50. The term "conditional use" employed in a zoning ordinance means a provi-
sional use for a purpose designated by the ordinance itself. See Schultz v. Board of
Adjustment, 258 Iowa 804, 806, 139 N.W.2d 448, 450 (1966). Conditional use is a
grant of right for any use specified by the ordinance subject to a finding by an
administrative officer or board that the use is proper, essential, advantageous or
desirable to the public good, convenience, health or welfare. Id.
51. The term "variance" is authority extended to the owner of a certain piece of
property, to use the property in a manner forbidden by the zoning ordinance, where
literal enforcement would cause him undue hardship. See Moody v. City of Univ.
Park, 278 S.W.2d 912, 920 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1955); Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 19 Ill. App. 2d 447, 154 N.E.2d 323, 325 (1958); Vogelaar v. Polk County
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1971).
52. The term "special use permit" is the grant by the zoning administrative body
pursuant to the existing provisions of the zoning law and subject to certain guidelines
and standards of a special use which is permitted under the provisions of the existing
zoning law. See Zengerle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 1, 276 A.2d 6,16
(1971) (where the court referred to a special use permit as a special exception).
53. Before granting an exception, a zoning board of adjustment was required to
hold a public hearing at which it would balance the public necessity for a landfill
versus the impact it would have on the environment and community. Some of the
factors a court must consider in balancing the impact that a sanitary landfill will
have on the environment and general health versus the need for a landfill includes the
growth of the neighborhood; most appropriate use of the land; availability of fire
fighting equipment; number of people residing and working within the immediate
area; traffic conditions; conservation of property values; effect of odors, dust, gas,
smoke, fumes, vibrations, noise upon uses of surrounding properties; ability of the
county to supply facilities for garbage collection and disposal; suitability of terrain
for the proposed use, necessity for the disposal of garbage. Id. at 8, 17-20, 276 A.2d
at 650, 654-55.
54. But see Sinn v. Board of Selectmen, 357 Mass. 606, 259 N.E.2d 557 (1970) (It
was noted that the existing town refuse disposal facility was located in an area only
subsequently zoned for residential use. Therefore it was not unreasonable for the
Board to extend that facility rather than construct a new one in another zone.); Rose
v. Commissioners of Pub. Health, 361 Mass. 625, 631, 282 N.E.2d 81, 84 n.7 (1972)
(where the court, based on the legislative intent, permitted a landfill in a zoned
residential area because the area was sparsely settled with a need for a landfill). In
some cases where it was imperative for a municipality to have a sanitary landfill,
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Thus, sanitary landfills are located in agricultural, 55 industrial 56 and
manufacturing 5 districts.
Attempts to completely exclude waste disposal facilities have been
upheld. 58 Municipalities may accomplish this through zoning restric-
tions or by refusing to grant permits for the operation of these facili-
ties. 59 A legitimate exercise of a municipality's zoning power is to
zoning boards would rezone a parcel of land from residential to agricultural or
industrial in order to grant a conditional use permit for the operation of a sanitary
landfill. See, e.g., Garren v. Winston-Salem, 463 F.2d 54, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1039 (1972); Nicholas v. Clinton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 43 Mich. App. 527, 204
N.W.2d 351 (1972).
55. See, e.g., Zengerle v. Board of Comm'rs, 262 Md. 1, 276 A.2d 646 (1971). In
Zengerle, the County wanted to use a certain piece of farm land for a sanitary
landfill. The Commission filed an application for a conditional use permit, special
exception and variance, to use the farm as a landfill. The County Board of Appeals
granted the permits and the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed. In Vogelaar v.
Polk County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860 (1971), the Supreme Court
of Iowa sustained the issuance of a special use permit for a sanitary landfill in an
agricultural area as proper, essential, and advantageous to the public good. The
court noted that a sanitary landfill was in accord with the state's policy of requiring
every city, town and county to establish a sanitary solid waste disposal project, and
that the same court had previously held that sanitary landfills qualify as a bona fide
waste disposal method. Id. at 863. In Bollinger v. Board of Supervisors, 217 Va. 192,
227 S.E.2d 682 (1976), the defendants issued a conditional use permit to the city and
county of Roanoke for the operation of a sanitary landfill on land zoned agricultural.
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the Board's action because the permit issued
by the Board contained extensive terms and conditions to protect the health, safety
and general welfare of the residents of the county.
56. See Garren v. Winston-Salem, 463 F.2d 54, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039
(1972). In Garren, the city rezoned certain land from residential to industrial for the
purpose of construction of a sanitary landfill, a use permitted only under the new
classification.
57. See Schultz v. Board of Adjustment, 258 Iowa 804, 139 N.W. 448 (1966). In
Schultz, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the issuance of a conditional use permit
by the county zoning board of adjustment within a general manufacturing district.
The county zoning ordinance specifically permitted a conditional use of land in a
general manufacturing district for the disposal of refuse.
58. See, e.g., Township of Vanport v. Brobeck, 22 Pa. Commw. 523, 349 A.2d
523 (1975). In Brobeck, the defendant was convicted of violating a zoning ordinance
prohibiting an open garbage dump within any district and where it could be con-
strued as a menace to public health. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held
that the zoning ordinance was constitutional because the town had the power to
regulate the use of land in order to protect public health, safety and welfare. County
of Cook v. Triem Steel & Processing Inc., 19 111. App. 2d 126, 153 N.E.2d 277 (1958).
In Triem, the County adopted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the disposal of refuse
within one mile of a municipality. The Illinois Appellate Court upheld the zoning
ordinance on the grounds that it was designed to protect the health and welfare of
the public by controlling the dumping of garbage or other offensive substances.
59. See, e.g., In re Town of Shelburne Zoning Appeal, 128 Vt. 89, 258 A.2d 836
(1969), where a municipality's zoning ordinance prohibited the dumping of refuse at
any place not approved by the town board. The state statute directed the cities and
town to provide and maintain sanitary landfills for refuse disposal. The court held
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limit the quantity of waste to be disposed within its boundaries6 °
because "no matter how carefully controlled, [it] present[s] some
hazard to a community."6' Municipalities may not, however, limit
the quantity of refuse to be disposed by discriminating on the basis of
its source.6 2
B. The Scope of the Problem
Two major factors contribute to the problem of efficient refuse
disposal: the inadequate number of sites 3 and the erroneous presump-
tion that solid waste disposal problems are unique to municipalities.
6 4
that a municipality could not deny a permit for the establishment of a sanitary
landfill unless the permit would give rise to a nuisance or the applicant had not
complied with the established regulations. In Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d
406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975) and O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288
N.E.2d 432 (1972), the Illinois Supreme Court held that non-home rule units may
not zone out sanitary landfills. See also General Battery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 498, 371 A.2d 1030 (1977), where the court said that
zoning ordinances are presumed valid.
60. See, e.g., Ex Parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 182, 80 P.2d 745, (Dist. Ct. App.
1938); Yaworski v. Town of Canterbury, 21 Conn. Supp. 347, 154 A.2d 758 (Super.
Ct. 1959); Boone Landfill, Inc., v. Boone County, 51 111. 2d 538, 283 N.E.2d 890
(1972); Southern Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean, 64 N.J. 190, 314 A.2d 65
(1974); Public Health Council v. Franklin Township Bd. of Health, 108 N.J. Super.
239, 260 A.2d 859 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Ench v. Mayor & Council of the
Township of Pequannock, 47 N.J. 535, 222 A.2d 1 (1966); Shaw v. Township of
Byram, 86 N.J. Super. 598, 207 A.2d 570 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); Wiggins v.
Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 149 N.E.2d 869, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958); Case v.
Knauf, 32 Misc. 2d 137, 224 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa.
576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959).
61. Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 221, 149 N.E.2d 869, 873, 173
N.Y.S.2d 579, 584 (1958). In order to minimize this potential hazard, municipalities
restrict the landfills within their boundaries to permit only those which are necessary
to handle the town's refuse. Municipalities also deal with the problem of solid waste
disposal by zoning ordinances permitting only municipally owned and operated
sanitary landfills within a residential area. See Kavanagh v. London Grove Town-
ship, 33 Pa. Commw. 420, 382 A.2d 148 (1978) (holding constitutional a Pennsylva-
nia zoning ordinance of this type).
62. See section IV infra.
63. See Note, The Commerce Clause and Interstate Waste Disposal: New Jersey's
Options After The Philadelphia Decision, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 31 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as New Jersey's Options]; Impermissible Isolation, supra note 13, at 343;
Sanitary Landfill, supra note 6, at 635-39; Is There A Solution?, supra note 37, at
135-38.
64. F. GRAD, G.W. RATHJENS, A.J. ROSENTHAL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: PRI-
ORITIES, POLICIES, AND THE LAW 154 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL]; Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT'L RE-
SOURCES J. 249, 257-58 (1979).
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Federal and state legislation which prohibit open dumping have
caused a sharp decrease in the number of land disposal sites.65 As a
result, municipalities must find other suitable means for solid waste
disposal. Although sanitary landfills have become a popular waste
disposal method,66 several problems prevent their increased use, in-
cluding the lack of land suitable for a solid waste receptacle.6 7 In
addition, the presence of restrictive and exclusionary ordinances limits
the number of available sites. 8  Finally, public opposition to the
location of sanitary landfills hinders municipal acquisition of appro-
priate landfill facilities.6 9
The persistent belief that solid waste disposal is a municipal prob-
lem prevents effective regulation.70  The problem of refuse disposal
transcends territorial limits and affects areas substantially larger than
a single municipality. 71 Furthermore, most municipalities are too
small to finance, construct or operate modern disposal facilities.7 2 The
increasing involvement of federal and state governments in solid waste
regulation indicates that the problems involving disposal have reached
regional and national proportions. 73  While the disposal of refuse
continues to be a municipal function, state and regional planning is
needed in order to find effective and economical solutions.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(3). See notes 91-98 infra and accompanying text.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901(b)(1), 6944(b) (1976); Municipal Refuse Disposal, supra
note 38, at 92. See also New Jersey's Options, supra note 63, at 33; Sanitary Landfill,
supra note 6, at 634; Is There A Solution?, supra note 37, at 132-33.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(6); New Jersey's Options, supra note 63, at 31, 36-38;
Note, Garbage, The Police Power, And The Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 8 CAP. L. REV. 613, 613 (1979); Is There A Solution?, supra note 37,
at 135-37.
68. Sanitary Landfill, supra note 6, at 638. A survey conducted by the American
Public Works Association in 1956 indicated that approximately 60 % of the cities in
the United States were restricted in the acquisition of land for solid waste disposal
sites by their own zoning ordinances. Municipal Refuse Disposal, supra note 38, at
95.
69. See Citizens Against Lewis and Clark Landfill v. Pottawattamie County Bd.,
277 N.W.2d 921, 922 (1979). Municipal Refuse Disposal, supra note 38, at 61; S.M.
Brown, Advanced Planning Critical In Establishing Effective Land Use Manage-
ment, 17 Solid Waste Management 62, 66 (May 1974); Sanitary Landfill, supra note
6, at 638; Is There A Solution?, supra note 37, at 138.
70. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, supra note 64, at 154.
71. Id. at 66, 153.
72. See New Jersey's Options, supra note 63, at 59; Impermissible Isolation, supra
note 13, at 349; Is There A Solution?, supra note 37, at 149-51.
73. Sanitary Landfill, supra note 68, at 633. See also note 75 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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III. Government Regulation of Solid Waste
Traditionally, solid waste disposal was considered to be a municipal
function.74 Federal and state statutes have been enacted, however,
because the problems associated with disposal are recognized as both
regional and national in nature. 75 With the enactment of these stat-
utes, courts are forced to consider the doctrine of preemption. 76 Al-
though some state legislation has been held to be preemptive, 77 it is
not strong enough to overcome parochial interests.
A. Statutory Provisions
The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,78 the first federal legislation
of its kind, authorized the funding of state and local governments for
research and development of new waste disposal technologies. 9 Solid
waste disposal is now regulated on the federal level by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) .80
The RCRA was enacted to promote the protection of health and
environment and to conserve valuable materials and energy re-
sources."' The Act prohibits future open dumping82 and requires the
74. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979). Sanitary Landfill, supra note 6, at
633.
76. See notes 102-66 infra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 128-66 infra and accompanying text.
78. Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 997,
(1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976)). In 1970, the Solid Waste
Disposal Act was amended by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-512, § 101 (b)(1), 84 Stat. 1227 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-81
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978)) which shifted the emphasis from disposal of wastes to the
demonstration, construction and resource recovery systems which preserve and en-
hance the quality of air, water and land resources. Id. 84 Stat. 1229-30, § 207. A
resource recovery system is a solid waste management system that provides for the
collection, separation, recycling and recovery of solid wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(23)
(1976).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976 & Supp. I 1978). One of the Congressional
Committees which drafted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act stated:
"[T]he approach taken by this legislation eliminates the last remaining loophole in
environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and
hazardous wastes .. " House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report
on H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976). Despite substantial advances in the
field of solid waste management, federal regulation of solid waste is not as advanced
as is federal control of the air and water pollution. F. GRAD, 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 4.02, at 4-52.3 (1980).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 6902.
82. Id. § 6902(3). It also regulates the treatment, storage, transportation and
disposal of hazardous wastes. Id. § 6902(4). The Act provides for training grants in
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conversion of existing dumps to facilities that do not present danger to
health and environment.83 Although the RCRA recognizes that solid
waste disposal is a national problem,8 4 statements found in the legisla-
tive history provide that "federal preemption . . . is undesirable, inef-
ficient and damaging to local initiative." 85 The RCRA provides for
federal assistance to state and local governments and interstate agen-
cies for the development of solid waste management plans.8 6  In
addition, the RCRA calls for the establishment of cooperative efforts
among federal, state and local governments.87  In order for states to
qualify for federal assistance they must submit a state solid waste
management plan and name a state agency to be responsible for the
plan's implementation. 88
The legislatures of all fifty states have enacted laws governing the
collection, disposal and management of solid waste. They establish
guidelines for collection and disposal facilities89 and require state
approval or permits for the operation of such facilities. 90 These plans
fall into three general categories. First, there are state plans which
entrust solid waste control to a state agency concerned with public
health.91 For example, Alabama provides that the state health de-
occupations involving solid waste disposal systems and a national research develop-
ment program. Id. § 6902(2)(6). This program aims to improve solid waste manage-
ment and resource conservation systems. Also, the Act provides for the demonstra-
tion, construction and application of solid waste management, resource recovery and
conservation systems. These systems are to preserve and enhance the quality of air,
water and land resources. Id. § 6902(7).
83. Id. § 6902(3).
84. Id. § 6901(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
85. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 10 reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 6238, 6271.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(1). These plans are for the improvement of solid waste
management techniques and methods of collection, separation and recovery of solid
waste. The Act also provides for the promulgation of guidelines for solid waste
collection, transport, separation, recovery and disposal practices and systems. Id. §
6902(5).
87. Id. § 6902(8).
88. Id. §§ 6943-47.
89. F. GRAD, 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.02, at 4-35 (1980).
90. Id.
91. State solid waste acts where the administering agency is the department of
health services include: Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 22-27-1 to 22-27-27 (1977 & Supp.
1979); Arizona: Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-441 (1977), ARtz. CODE tit. 9, §§ 8-401-
433 (1979); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-20-101 to 115, 201 to 205 (1973 &
Supp. 1978); Hawaii: HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 340A-1 to 340A-3 (1976 & Supp. 1980);
Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 19-2-1-1 to 34 (1974 & Supp. 1979); Maryland: MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, §§ 394-394B (1980 & Supp. 1980); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. §§
17-17-1 to 17-17-41 (Supp. 1981); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 147:23-
147:47 (1977 & Supp. 1979); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-29-01 to
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partment shall have supervision over the equipment, methodology
and personnel employed in the management of solid wastes.9 In
addition, Alabama state and county boards of health may adopt rules
and regulations to specify the methodology and procedures required
by these acts.9 3
Second, state statutes may authorize a state agency concerned with
the environment to control solid waste disposal.9 4 This was the ap-
proach taken by Connecticut when it established a Department of
Environmental Protection in 1973.05 The department commissioner
examines all existing and proposed solid waste facilities and is autho-
rized to plan, design, construct and operate them in order to prevent
air and water pollution. 6 The department protects, conserves and
23-29-15 (1978); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2251 to 2265 (West 1973);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-4301 to 4324 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Texas: TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 §§ 1-11 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1980-81); Utah:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-15-5(5)(c) (1976); Virginia: VA. CODE §§ 32.1-177 to 32.1-186
(1979 & Supp. 1981); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 16-1-9 to 16-9-8 (1979).
92. ALA. CODE §§ 22-27-1 to 22-27-27, (1977 & Supp. 1979).
93. Id.
94. State solid waste statutes authorizing a state agency concerned with the envi-
ronment, natural resources, and pollution problems to regulate waste disposal in-
clude: Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.030.020, .710 to .840, .860 to .900 (1977 & Supp.
1980); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18 §§ 60.010-60.130 (1978); Arkansas: ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 82-2701-2712 (1976); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-524a-19-
524nn (West 1977 & Supp. 1981); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.701-403.715
(West Supp. 1981); Georgia: CA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1601 to 1620 (1978); Hawaii:
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 342-1 to 342-54 (1976 & Supp. 1980); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1111/2, §§ 1001-1061 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1981-82); Iowa: IOWA CODE §§
455B.75 to 455B.99 (Supp. 1981-82); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 109.011 to
109.250, 224.005 to 224.900 (Supp. 1980); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
1121-1124, § 1150.1-26 (West 1979); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§
1301-1319-A (1978 & Supp. 1981-82); Massachusetts: MAss. CEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 16,
§§ 18-24B (West 1979); Michigan: MIcH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 299.401 to 299.437 (Supp.
1981-82); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115A.01-115A.72 (West Supp. 1981);
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 260.200 to .245 (Vernon Supp. 1981); Nebraska: NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 81-1516 to 81-1525 (1971), §§ 19-2101 to 19-2113 (1977); Nevada:
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 444.440 to 444.630 (1979); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
13:lE-1 to 13:IE-48 (West 1979), 48:13A-1 to 13 (West Supp. 1981-82); New York:
N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0101 to 1315 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1980-81);
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3734.01-.99 (Baldwin 1980 & Supp. 1980); Oregon:
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 459.005-285 (1980); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§
6018.101-1003 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.9-1
to 18.9-11 (1979 & Supp. 1980); South Dakota: S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-6-1
to 34A-6-50 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2201-2204
(1975 & Supp. 1981); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.95.010 to
70.95.911 (1975 & Supp. 1981); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43 to 144.48
(West 1974 & Supp. 1981-82); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. §§ 35-11-501 to 35-11-503
(1977 & Supp. 1981).
95. Connecticut Solid Waste Management Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-
524a(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
96. Id. § 19-524b.
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improves the natural resources and environment of the state and
ensures that the health, safety and welfare of the people of Connecti-
cut are safeguarded and enhanced. 9
7
The third approach taken by state governments in establishing
uniform disposal systems is the creation of a separate entity for the
exclusive control of solid waste. 8 For example, the Delaware Solid
Waste Authority Act 9 provides for a "[p]ublic instrumentality of the
State established and created for the performance of an essential
public and governmental function . . . known as the Delaware Solid
Waste Authority."' 00  The functions of the Authority include the
planning, designing, financing, construction, ownership, manage-
ment, and operaton of solid waste disposal and resource recovery
facilities. 101
B. Preemption
It is well established that a state may enact legislation, in the
exercise of its police power, affecting interstate commerce as long as
the federal government has not taken preemptive action.10 2  State
action may be held an invalid interference with federal legislation
either because it is in actual conflict with the operation of a federal
program or because it affects an area that Congress has validly re-
97. Id.
98. State solid waste laws authorizing a separate entity with exclusive control over
the field of solid waste include: California: CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66700-66796.83
(West Supp. 1966-80) (Solid Waste Management Board); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, §§ 6401-6426 (Supp. 1980) (Delaware Solid Waste Authority Act); District of
Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-501 to 6-511 (1973 Supp. 1977) (Commissioners of
the District of Columbia); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 31-4401 to 31-4410 (Supp. 1981)
(Board of County Commissioners); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3401 to 3419
(1980) (Department of Health and Environment); Montana: MONT. ADMIN. CODE §§
16-2.14 (2)-S14100 (1974) (Department of Health and Environmental Sciences); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:13A-1 to -13 (1978) (Board of Public Utility Commis-
sion); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-48-1 to 3-48-7 (1981) (Municipalities), §§
4-56-1 to 4-56-3 (1981) (Board of County Commissioners); North Carolina: N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 130-166.16 to 166.21F. (1974 & Supp. 1979) (Department of Human
Resources); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-1 to 19-29 (1979 & Supp. 1980)
(R.I. Solid Waste Management Corp.); South Carolina: S.C. CODE §§ 44-67-10 to
44-67-130 (Supp. 1979) (Department of Health & Environmental Control); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE §§ 7-1-3e to 3f (1976); §§ 7-16-1 to 7-16-8 (Supp. 1981)
(County Solid Waste Authorities).
99. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6401-6426 (Supp. 1980).
100. Id. § 6403.
101. Id. § 6404.
102. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977), rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977). See
also B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142-43 (2d ed. 1979).
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served to the federal government. 0 3 The Supreme Court pronounced
that a state is precluded or preempted from acting only where either
the nature of the subject matter or an explicit declaration of congres-
sional design indicates that state action is precluded.0 4 The enact-
ment of state statutes regulating the disposal of solid waste affects
interstate commerce; therefore, courts are forced to consider the doc-
trine of preemption.1 0 5
1. Federal
The view expressed by Congress in the RCRA that solid waste
disposal is a national problem 10 has not been extended to include the
preemption of state statutes. 107 The issue of federal preemption was
first discussed in a series of state and federal decisions regarding the
power of the State of New Jersey to prohibit the disposal of all solid
waste originating outside the state. 108 An action in the New Jersey
state courts challenged the constitutionality of this statute'0 9 as a
violation of the commerce clause." 0 The New Jersey Supreme Court
ultimately held that the statute was not preempted by the Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1965"' and was not a violation of the commerce
clause." 2 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion" 3 and the decision was appealed. 1 4  However, the RCRA,
which expanded the role of the federal government in solid waste
disposal, had become law prior to the Court's consideration of the
merits." 5 The Supreme Court vacated the state's decision and re-
103. L. TIBE, AMECAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 377 (1st reprint 1978).
104. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
105. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 619-21 (1978).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (Supp. III 1979).
107. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 (1978).
108. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), rev'd, 68 N.J.
451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975), vacated sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430
U.S. 141 (1977), modified, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d 888 (1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
109. Waste Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:11-1 to 10 (West 1979).
110. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), rev'd, 68 N.J.
451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975).
111. Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-87 (1976)).
112. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975).
113. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
114. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).




manded the case to the state courts on the issue of preemption in light
of the recent enactment of the RCRA. 1" 6  On remand," 7 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the state statute banning the disposal
of out-of-state waste was consistent with the federal program and was
not preempted. 18 In addition, the court reaffirmed its prior holding
that the New Jersey statute was not a violation of the commerce
clause."11
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court for a
stay of this judgment 120 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction. 121
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 122 the Court agreed with the
New Jersey court and held that the state law was not preempted by
the RCRA. 2 3 The Court determined that Congress did not have a
clear and manifest purpose to preempt the states in the regulation of
solid waste.124 In so ruling, how ever, the Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional because it banned the disposal of out-of-state
wastes. 125
2. State
The doctrine of preemption includes the notion that a state's legisla-
tive or administrative authority may override municipal regulation. 12
A few states have taken an active role in solid waste disposal. 27
116. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 143 (1977).
117. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d 888 (1977).
118. Id. at 574, 376 A.2d at 894.
119. Id.
120. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 434 U.S. 964 (1977).
121. Id.
122. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
123. Id. at 620.
124. Id. at 620-21 n.4. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, 94TH CONG., 2D Sess. 3,10
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6271. It was the Committee's
intention that "federal assistance should be an incentive for state and local authorities
to act to solve the discarded materials problem."
125. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
126. See County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389
N.E.2d 553 (1979); City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357
N.E.2d 433 (1976); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill. 2d 256,
347 N.E.2d 716 (1976); Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493
(1975); City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Il. 2d 484, 332 N.E.2d 11
(1974); O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972);
Southern Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Ocean, 64 N.J. 190, 314
A.2d 65 (1974); Ringlieb v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 283 A.2d 97 (1971);
Town of Glocester v. R.I. Solid Waste Management Corp., - R.I. -, 390 A.2d
348 (1978).
127. See, e.g., Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 1001-1051 (1977) (The
Illinois Environmental Protection Act); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1 to
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Within these states, therefore, it has been necessary for the courts to
determine whether state and municipal refuse disposal regulations
operate concurrently or whether the municipal regulations are pre-
empted.
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act of 1970128 was enacted to
provide for a statewide program of environmental regulation specifi-
cally designed to address the problems of solid waste treatment and
disposal.129 Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution of 1970,130 many
municipalities and counties were home rule units with broad regula-
tory powers. 131 There was some question as to the regulatory powers
of non-home rule units. 132 As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court
heard several cases involving the issue of whether the Environmental
Protection Act preempted both home rule and non-home rule environ-
mental regulation. 133
In O'Connor v. City of Rockford,134 the court held that a non-home
rule county cannot require a city, in its operation of a landfill, to
comply with a county ordinance because the Act was intended to
override local regulation. 135 When a non-home rule municipality
sought to require an operator of a proposed landfill to comply with its
environmental protection ordinance, the court followed the legislative
policies of the Act and the rationale of O'Connor and held that the Act
preempted local regulation. 136
The Supreme Court of Illinois also ruled on the authority of home
rule units. When the Environmental Protection Agency filed a com-
plaint against a home rule city for operating a landfill without an
agency permit, the court upheld the city's issuance of a permit
through its own environmental agency and declared that state and
local governments can legislate concurrently on environmental is-
sues. 137  In a subsequent decision, a home rule municipality at-
13:1E-48 (West 1979) (The New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act), §§ 48:13A-1
to 12 (West 1979) (The Solid Waste Utility Control Act of 1970); Rhode Island: R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 19-4 to 19-29 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 1001-1051 (1977).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, §§ 1020-1022(a)(ii) (1977).
130. ILL. CONST. art. VII § 6(a).
131. Id. "[A] home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function
pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to
regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare .. "
132. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343 N.E.2d 493 (1975);
O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
133. See cases cited in note 126 supra.
134. 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972).
135. Id. at 367, 288 N.E.2d at 436.
136. Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 408, 343 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1975).




tempted to apply its city health ordinance to a regional sewage treat-
ment plant.' 38  The court ruled that the application of the city's
ordinance to the plant was not within the constitutional grant of home
rule powers,' 3 noting that local regulation interferes with the greater
interest of the regional district. 140
In County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. ,'14 the Illinois
Supreme Court resolved the apparent discrepancy between home rule
decisions 42 and affirmed its position as to the regulation of non-home
rule units. 43 A home rule county sought to enjoin the private owner
of a sanitary landfill from further development and operation of the
landfill until it complied with the county's zoning laws.'44 The court
determined that the county had the authority to impose zoning re-
strictions.' 45 It also found that the Pollution Control Board, which is
empowered to review the Environmental Protection Agency's decision
in the granting of permits, had the power to adopt regulations for the
location of landfills, but not to designate the actual site. 146 Thus, the
court held that these "distinct but concurrent powers"' 47 must be
exercised cooperatively to accomplish the public policy of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act.' 48 A home rule unit in Illinois, therefore,
may legislate concurrently with the state on solid waste disposal as
long as it conforms with the minimum standards established by the
Act. 149  As to non-home rule units, however, the court decided that
the Environmental Protection Act preempts municipal regulation. 50
Rhode Island, in 1974, enacted legislation which preempted the
regulation of solid waste collection and disposal by local municipali-
ties. 15' The Rhode Island Supreme Court had to determine whether a
138. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. v. City of Des Plaines, 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d
716 (1976).
139. Id. at 261, 347 N.E.2d at 719.
140. Id.
141. 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d 553 (1979).
142. See notes 137-40 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
144. County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co., 75 Ill. 2d 494, 389 N.E.2d
553 (1979).
145. Id. at 511, 389 N.E.2d at 558.
146. Id. at 516, 389 N.E.2d at 560.
147. Id. at 516-17, 389 N.E.2d at 561.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 514, 389 N.E.2d at 559-60, citing City of Chicago v. Pollution Control
Bd., 59 Ill. 2d 484, 322 N.E.2d 11 (1974).
150. Id. at 515, 389 N.E.2d at 560, citing O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d
360, 388 N.E.2d 432 (1972) and Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343
N.E.2d 493 (1975).
151. The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation Act of 1974, R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 19-1 to 19-29 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
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town ordinance banning the importation of solid wastes not originat-
ing within the town was preempted by the Rhode Island Solid Waste
Management Corporation Act.1 52 The court examined the legislative
intent and found that it had enacted the statute because of the ineffi-
cient practices and management techniques of municipalities. 153 The
court declared that the legislature intended "disposal of solid waste to
be handled on a statewide basis with control centralized in the Corpo-
ration."15 4 Therefore, the court held that the Act preempted munici-
pal regulation of solid waste collection and disposal. 155
In 1970, New Jersey adopted two statutes1 56 which make the state
solid waste industry a public utility 157 and require the development
and formulation of statewide, regional, county, and inter-county
plans for solid waste management. 58  Owners and operators of a
private sanitary landfill sought a determination that the legislature
had preempted a township ordinance regulating the operation of
landfills. 159 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that with these acts
the legislature intended to uniformly regulate the field of solid waste
collection, disposal and management. 0 The court stated:
[i]f each municipality in the state could place and restrict in a
manner similar to . . . the ordinance passed by the Parsippany-
Troy Hills, . . . the conflicting ordinances and requirements of the
separate municipalities would bring to a complete halt the sanitary
landfill operations in this state, the refuse disposal business, all to
the detriment of the general health of the general public.'
152. Town of Glocester v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., - R.I.
__, 390 A.2d 348 (1978).
153. Id. at -, 390 A.2d at 349.
154. id.
155. Id.
156. The Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1-48 (West
1979), and the Solid Waste Utility Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:13A-1-12
(West Cum. Supp. 1978).
157. Id. § 13:1E-27.
158. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-2. Both statutes do not mention the legislative
concern below inter-county level except that they are enforceable on a local level. Id.
§ 13:1E-9; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:13A-1-12. In 1971 the supplement to the Solid
Waste Management Act provided that local governments may adopt health or envi-
ronmental protection ordinances or regulations "more stringent" than the Act. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-17 (1971).
159. Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 351, 283 A.2d
97, 99 (1971).
160. Id. at 353, 283 A.2d at 100.
161. Id. at 352, 283 A.2d at 100.
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Thus, the court concluded that the town cannot provide additional
protection with an ordinance which imposes penalties or requires the
same procedures as those of the state.16 2
In 1971, the New Jersey legislature added a supplement to the Solid
Waste Management Act which provided that local governments may
adopt health or environmental protection ordinances or regulations
"more stringent than this Act." 16 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court
declared that it was the legislative intent to give local governments
authority to regulate the technical operation of waste disposal facili-
ties.16 4 The town's ordinance, however, attempted to assume com-
plete control over landfill operations.' 5 Hence, the court held that
the town's ordinance was invalid because it was inconsistent with the
concept of regionalization of waste disposal facilities. 166
IV. The Constitutionality of Waste Disposal Bans and Restrictions
Solid waste disposal is a necessary but unwanted governmental
function. In order to protect parochial interests, various state and
municipal governments have banned the disposal of waste originating
outside their territorial boundaries. 16 7 These bans, although based on
a purported desire to protect public health and the environment, were
constitutionally challenged by operators of private sanitary land-
fills. 168
A. State
In 1972, New Jersey enacted a Waste Control Act' 69 which prohib-
ited the disposal of all wastes generated out of state in order'to protect
public health, safety and welfare. 170 The Supreme Court held this
Act violative of the commerce clause in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.'17  The Court determined that waste is commerce and that
162. Id. at 354, 283 A.2d at 101.
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-17 (1971).
164. Southern Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Ocean, 64 N.J. 190,
195, 314 A.2d 65, 66 (1974).
165. Id. at 192, 314 A.2d at 66.
166. Id. at 195, 314 A.2d at 67.
167. See notes 169-238 infra and accompanying text.
168. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 625 (1978); Dutchess
Sanitation Serv., Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670, 677, 417 N.E.2d 74, 78,
435 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1980); Impermissible Isolation, supra note 13, at 343.
169. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-1 to 13:1E-48 (West 1979).
170. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-9-10 (West 1979). The Act included a legislative
finding that the state's environment was threatened by the treatment and disposal of
waste which originated out of state. Id. § 13:11-9.
171. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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"all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection;
none is excluded by definition at the outset. ' 172 The New Jersey
statute was struck down because it discriminated against waste, an
article of commerce, on the basis of origin. 173  The Court found that
the Waste Control Act imposed the burden of conserving New Jersey's
landfills on other states and was an attempt by the state to isolate itself
from "a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the
movement of interstate trade." 174
The Court also expressed a fear that New York and Pennsylvania
would enact retaliatory statutes banning the disposal of extraterritor-
ial solid waste if the New Jersey statute was upheld.'7 5  In fact,
Pennsylvania enacted a retaliatory statute in 1977 while the City of
Philadelphia decision was pending. 7  The Court's decision had been
written prior to the enactment of the statute, however, and it was
never challenged.
The purpose of the commerce clause is to establish a national
economic unit. 77 Retaliatory statutes have been held to frustrate this
172. Id. at 622. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court examined the
lower court's analysis of whether the interstate movement of solid waste is "com-
merce." See Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 127 N.J. Super. 160, 170, 316 A.2d 711, 719 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974),
rev'd, 68 N.J. 451, 468, 348 A.2d 505, 514 (1975), vacated sub nom. City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977), modified, 73 N.J. 562, 376 A.2d
888 (1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The lower court held that garbage was a
legitimate subject of interstate commerce because refuse has a market value for
recycling and other purposes. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the banned
wastes were those which could not be put into effective use and, therefore, these
wastes were not commerce at all. The Supreme Court rejected the New Jersey court's
suggestion that the banning of valueless out-of-state wastes implicates no constitu-
tional protection. See also United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 24:2
F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966), where the Third Circuit held that the business of collecting and
disposing of refuse constituted interstate commerce. Although the court dealt with a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a finding that disposal services are commerce
also determines that the industry's activities are interstate commerce for the purpose
of the commerce clause. 357 F.2d at 808.
173. 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
174. Id. at 628. The Court stated that it did not matter that the ultimate aim of
the New Jersey statute was to reduce waste disposal costs or to save remaining open
lands from pollution since the Court assumed that New Jersey had the right to protect
its taxpayers' money as well as their environment. Furthermore, it declared that New
Jersey could have pursued those ends by slowing the flow of all the waste into New
Jersey's remaining landfills. Id. at 626-28.
175. Id. at 629.
176. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6007 (f.l) (Purdon 1977).
177. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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goal.178  If one state has the power to exclude solid waste from final
disposition within its borders all states have that power, and the effect
would be to halt commerce at state lines.7 9 In addition, the threat of
economic isolation may not be used as a weapon to force other states
into reciprocal agreements. 180
The Tenth Circuit, in Hardage v. Atkins,' 8' invalidated the Okla-
homa Controlled Industrial Waste Disposal Act 8 2 because it con-
tained a reciprocity clause. The Oklahoma statute forbade the receipt
and disposal of controlled industrial wastes into the state unless the
state of origin had enacted: (1) "substantially similar standards for
controlled industrial waste disposal as Oklahoma; and (2) had entered
into a reciprocity agreement with the State of Oklahoma." 8 3 Plain-
tiff challenged the reciprocity clause of the Act because another state,
a potential customer of plaintiff, did not have a reciprocal agreement
with Oklahoma.8 4 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Oklahoma
statute violated the commerce clause because the shipment of out of
state industrial waste into Oklahoma was prohibited unless the state
of origin had a reciprocal agreement.185
In a related decision the Tenth Circuit considered whether the
entire Oklahoma statute or only the clause relating to reciprocity
agreements was unconstitutional. 8 6 The court held the entire statute
to be unconstitutional because the substantially similar standards pro-
vision, in effect, imposed an economic embargo on industrial waste. 187
As a result of the determination that state exclusionary statutes
barring solid waste disposal violate the commerce clause, all such
statutes are unconstitutional. Despite this fact, not all state exclusion-
ary statutes have been challenged or repealed. 88  A few remain in
178. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Oklahoma v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
179. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
180. A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
181. 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
182. OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2751-2765 (West 1978).
183. Id. § 2764.
184. Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1265 (10th Cir. 1978).
185. Id. at 1266-67.
186. Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 873-74.
188. The states with exclusionary statutes are Delaware: DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 1701
(Supp. 1976); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1021 (Smith-Hurd 1977); Louisi-
ana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.36 (West Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979 La. Acts
No. 449, § 5); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (Supp. 1976); Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270 § 17A (West Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979); New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:30-f (Supp. 1973); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
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effect, but should these statutes be challenged, it is doubtful they will
be upheld.189
B. Municipal
Whereas states have enacted legislation to prevent state regulation
of waste disposal, municipalities have erected barriers against both
intrastate and interstate importation of solid waste. 90 Municipal
bans, like state exclusionary statutes, prevent the realization of an
effective means of solid waste disposal. They have been challenged as
a violation of the commerce clause' 9' and also as an illegitimate
exercise of the police power. 192
ANN. § 13:11 9-1110 (West Supp. 1976); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
2751-65 (West Supp. 1980); Pennsylvania: 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6007 (f.1)
(Purdon 1977); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS 19-7 (Supp. 1976); and Vermont: VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2204 (1975) (repealed 1979 Vt. Acts No. 47, § 1(1)). These
statutes fall into four categories which are not mutually exclusive. The first category
is those statutes which have a valid state objective in preserving health. Examples of
these are the Illinois statute which subjects waste entering the state to the same
handling requirements that apply to internal waste, and Louisiana's statute which
directs a ban against industrial waste if it is reasonably foreseeable that it will
endanger public health. The second category includes those statutes which seek to
exclude all waste except for any materials that may be used for the production of new
commodities or recycling. States with such statutes include Maine, New Hampshire
and Massachusetts. The third category of state exclusionary statutes are those in
which the legislatures vest in an administrative body the ultimate decision to bar
waste. For example, Delaware requires a permit from the Board of Health before
any refuse may be brought into the state. Before it was found unconstitutional, New
Jersey imposed an absolute prohibition until the commissioner determined such
action can be permitted without endangering the public health. Before it was found
unconstitutional, Oklahoma's statute prohibited the shipment of controlled industrial
waste into Oklahoma unless the state of origin had standards for the disposal of
industrial waste which were substantially similar to those of Oklahoma and the state
of origin had entered into a reciprocity agreement with Oklahoma. The determina-
tion of whether the state of origin's statute had substantially similar standards was to
be made by the Director of Controlled Industrial Waste Management and all reci-
procity agreements had to be approved by the Governor of Oklahoma. The last
category of state exclusionary statutes are those unrelated to effecting a valid state
objective. Examples of these state exclusionary statutes are found in Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Vermont. Pennsylvania's statute is a retaliatory embargo against
states having exclusionary statutes. Rhode Island and Vermont have absolute em-
bargos.
189. The state exclusionary statutes that are still in effect include: Delaware: DEL.
CODE tit. 16, § 1701 (Supp. 1976); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111/2 § 1021
(Smith-Hurd 1977); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (Supp. 1976); New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:30f (1981); Pennsylvania: 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6007 (f.l) (Purdon 1977); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-7 (Supp.
1980).
190. See notes 193-238 infra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 193-211 infra and accompanying text.
192. See notes 212-238 infra and accompanying text.
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1. Commerce Clause
The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation chal-
lenged a municipality's anti-importation ordinance which banned the
disposal of out of town waste within its boundaries in Town of Gloces-
ter v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp.193 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional issue because it
determined that the state had preempted municipal regulation of solid
waste disposal. 94 Thus, the town's ordinance was repugnant to the
state's policy of the statewide management of solid waste. 95 In
Dutchess Sanitation Service, Inc. v. Town of Plattekill,196 the ordi-
nance of a New York municipality which prohibited any waste origi-
nating out of town from disposal within its territorial limits was
challenged by the owner and operator of a sanitary landfill located
within the town. 197  The plaintiff sought to vacate that part of the
injunction which prevented the disposal of refuse originating out of
state. 98 The New York Court of Appeals held, citing City of Philadel-
phia, that the town's ordinance violated the commerce clause because
the town was regulating refuse solely on the basis of its origin.9 9 A
town ordinance disallowing the acceptance of refuse originating out of
town for final disposal in the town 200 was declared constitutional by
the New York Court of Appeals, however, in Monroe-Livingston
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia.20 1 The court found that
193. - R.I. -, 390 A.2d at 348 (1978).
194. Id. at -, 390 A.2d at 349.
195. Id.
196. 51 N.Y.2d 670, 417 N.E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1980).
197. Id. at 672, 417 N.E.2d at 76, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 962, 963. The Plattekill Town
Ordinance Regulating Garbage, Rubbish and Other Articles read in part: "No li-
censee shall collect any garbage, rubbish and waste materials of any kind which
originate outside the bounds of the Town of Plattekill in the Town of Plattekill
dumping area or any other property, public or private in the Town of Plattekill."
198. In Town of Plattekill v. Dutchess Sanitation Inc., 56 A.D.2d 150, 391
N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dept. 1977), the court granted a permanent injunction against
Dutchess.
199. 51 N.Y.2d 670, 677, 417 N.E.2d 74, 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1980). In the
final footnote of the court's decision it was noted that three judges of the court would
have held the ordinance invalid "not only in effect, but facially as well." Id. at 678
n.3, 417 N.E.2d at 78 n.3, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 966 n.3.
200. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d
679, 682-83, 417 N.E.2d 78, 79, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (1980). Town of Caledonia
enacted its Sanitary Landfill Ordinance on July 17, 1976. The ordinance provided:
"Refuse generated outside of the Town of Caledonia, New York will not be accepted
at facilities licensed by the Town of Caledonia unless authorized by the Town Board
and consistent with the regional comprehensive plan as it relates to solid waste
management."
201. Id. at 685, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
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the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate refuse, but in-
stead excluded all out of town refuse. 20 2
The dissenting opinion by Judge Fuchsberg noted that the town
ordinance facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 20 3 The
dissent found the ordinance to be a direct prohibition against inter-
state commerce because it prevented a private landfill company from
contracting with out-of-state carting companies or with intrastate
companies and municipalities which engaged in interstate com-
merce. 20 4 The operation of the town disposal facility was not subject
to the ordinance. 20 - Therefore, the ordinance discriminated against
private facilities. 206
Judge Fuchsberg also pointed out the majority's confusion with the
meaning of "out of town." 20 7 In Dutchess, the ordinance prohibiting
"out of town" refuse, which included refuse that originated "out of
state," was held unconstitutional because the town discriminated
against refuse on the basis of origin. 20 8 In Monroe-Livingston, the
ordinance also discriminated against "out of town" waste, but this
was held to be valid because the court interpreted the term to include
refuse which originated only within the state. 20 9 Both ordinances on
their face, and in their effect, discriminated against solid waste on the
basis of origin. Therefore, Judge Fuchsberg argued that both ordi-
nances should have been held unconstitutional. 210
[E]xperience teaches that parochial protectionist measures, fueled
by an understandable but impermissible purpose to conserve the
landfill site for the townspeople alone, are almost sure to spawn
reciprocal exclusionary acts, which in totality would soon consti-
tute a serious impediment to the free flow of interstate com-
merce. 
2 1
202. Id. at 684, 417 N.E.2d at 80, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
203. Id. at 685, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 686, 417 N.E.2d at 82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969-70 (Fuchsberg, J., dissent-
ing).
205. Id. at 686, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 688, 417 N.E.2d at 83, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 688, 417 N.E.2d at 83, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71 (Fuchsberg, J., dissent-
ing).
208. Dutchess Sanitation Serv., Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670, 677,
417 N.E.2d 74, 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1980).
209. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d
679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980).
210. Id. at 685, 417 N.E.2d at 81, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 687, 417 N.E.2d at 82, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
See also Schiener v. Penfold, Index No. E91205/81 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 5/15/81),
where Justice Joslin held invalid a Solid Waste Management Ordinance enacted by
the Town of Sardinia because the Town Board failed to prepare an Environmental
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2. Illegitimate Exercise of the Police Power
Municipalities also attempt to control solid waste disposal through
the use of their zoning power. 21 2  The propriety of restrictive or
exclusive municipal zoning ordinances has been seriously questioned.
In fact, courts have held these zoning ordinances to be unconstitu-
tional. 213 Although a municipality may limit the quantity of refuse
disposed as a legitimate exercise of its zoning power,1 4 a municipality
may not limit quantity by discriminating on the basis of the source of
refuse .215
For example, the California Court of Appeals in Ex Parte Lyons 216
held that a county ordinance banning the importation of refuse pro-
duced outside the county is an arbitrary and improper exercise of the
town's police power. 21 7 The county argued that the disposal of solid
waste originating outside of the county created a menace to public
health, welfare and safety.218  The court noted that while it is possible
that an increase in the quantity of refuse may endanger the public
health, the ordinance did not limit the amount of waste, but discrimi-
nated against refuse on the basis of origin. 219  The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Lutz v. H. T. Armour220 found a similar ordinance
Impact Statement prior to the ordinance's adoption. The town ordinance substan-
tially duplicated the professional and scientific procedures which are within the
regulatory responsibility of the Department of Environmental Conservation. The
court found that
[a]rticle 8 of the Environmental Conservation Law requires that an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement be undertaken before the adoption of legisla-
tion which will affect the operation of an existing landfill. The EIS should
review the impact of the proposed ordinance not only upon the subject
municipality but also upon the entire region served by the landfill opera-
tion. This will have the effect of deterring unrestrained provincialism and
of furthering the reasonable use of governmental police power in promot-
ing the overall public interest.
212. See notes 24-62 supra and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., ExParte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 182, 80 P.2d 745 (1938); Yaworski
v. Town of Canterbury, 21 Conn. Supp. 347, 154 A.2d 758 (1959); Lutz v. Armour,
395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959); Carlson v. Village of Worth, 62 Ill. 2d 406, 343
N.E.2d 493 (1975); O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 52 Ill, 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432
(1972); Boone Landfill, Inc. v. Boone County, 51 Ill. 2d 538, 283 N.E.2d 890 (1972);
Southern Ocean Landfill, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of the Township of Ocean, 64
N.J. 190, 314 A.2d 65 (1974); General Battery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 29 Pa.
Commw. 498, 371 A.2d 1030 (1977).
214. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
215. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
216. 27 Cal. App. 2d 182, 80 P.2d 745 (1938).
217. Id. at __80 P.2d at 749.
218. Id. at -, 80 P.2d at 746.
219. Id. at -, 80 P.2d at 749.
220. 395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959).
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unconstitutional. 22' The court, citing Ex Parte Lyons, stated that the
effect of the ordinance was to make any quantity of out of town refuse
harmful to public health, while local waste, regardless of amount, did
not violate the town's health standards. 222 This distinction was held
to be arbitrary, discriminatory and without merit. 2 3
In Yaworski v. Town of Canterbury, 24 the Superior Court of Con-
necticut declared a town ordinance void because it prohibited the
disposal of out of town refuse within its borders. 225 The court held
that the legislature granted municipalities only the power to regulate
the disposal of solid waste. 22  This power, the court ruled, did not
include the power to ban.2 27 The New Jersey Supreme Court in
Southern Ocean Landfill Inc. v. Mayor and Council of the Township
of Ocean228 struck down an ordinance because it conflicted with the
legislature's policy of regionalization of waste facilities. 229 Both the
New Jersey and Connecticut courts determined that their respective
legislatures had preempted municipal action in the area of solid waste
disposal .230
Geographic origin also has been rejected as a basis for discriminat-
ing against solid waste generated outside a municipality. 231 In Boone
Landfill Inc. v. Boone County,232 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
a county may not ban the disposal of refuse solely on the basis of its
geographical source. 233 The court rejected the county's claim that the
purpose of the zoning ordinance was to limit the quantity of refuse
discarded.2 34 A town zoning ordinance completely excluding indus-
trial waste disposal facilities within its boundaries was challenged in
General Battery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Alsace Town-
ship.235 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that the De-
partment of Environmental Resources controls the waste disposal fa-
221. Id. at 581, 151 A.2d at 111.
222. Id. at 579-80, 151 A.2d at 110.
223. Id.
224. 21 Conn. Supp. 347, 154 A.2d 758 (1959).
225. Id. at 352, 154 A.2d at 761.
226. Id. at 351, 154 A.2d at 760-61.
227. Id.
228. 64 N.J. 190, 314 A.2d 65 (1974).
229. Id. at 193-94, 314 A.2d at 66-67.
230. Id. at 194, 314 A.2d at 67; Yaworski v. Town of Canterbury, 21 Conn. Supp.
347, 351, 154 A.2d at 758, 760-61 (1959).
231. See notes 173, 199, 208-210 supra and accompanying text.
232. 51 111. 2d 538, 283 N.E.2d 890 (1972).
233. Id. at 542, 283 N.E.2d at 892.
234. Id.
235. 29 Pa. Commw. 498, 371 A.2d 1030 (1977).
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cilities, and therefore, the facilities did not create health or safety
hazards which would justify the total exclusion of disposal facilities. 23
Although the town argued that the ordinance protected its residents
from waste generated in another municipality, 237 the court concluded
that the origin of solid waste has little bearing on whether its disposal
is harmful.2 38
Sanitary landfills are a necessary solution to solid waste disposal. 23
Suitable land is the basic requirement for this method of disposal.
Municipalities, because of an inadequate number of available landfill
sites, public opposition, and environmental and health hazards, have
responded with zoning ordinances or solid waste plans which ban the
importation of intrastate and interstate refuse.2 40  These ordinances
cause the refuse to accumulate in municipalities which are unable to
provide for disposal and, therefore, endanger the health and welfare
of residents and non-residents. 24'
Municipalities have the power to enact ordinances regulating and
restricting the disposal of solid waste. 242 It is evident that this power
includes the power to ban the importation of intrastate refuse.2 43
Municipalities, however, may not interfere with interstate commerce
by prohibiting the disposal of refuse originating out-of-state within
their boundaries.2 44 The primary objective of states and municipali-
ties in enacting anti-importation statutes is to prolong the lifespan of
their landfills.2 45 The United States Supreme Court in City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey2 46 held that this goal was unconstitutional
because it permits states and municipalities to isolate themselves from
a national problem. 247
236. Id. at 502, 371 A.2d at 1032.
237. id.
238. Id. at 503, 371 A.2d at 1033.
239. See notes 9-12, 66 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 58-73, Section IV B supra and accompanying text.
241. J. GOLDSTEIN, GARBAGE As You LiKE IT 47 (1969).
242. See notes 59-62, 190-238 supra and accompanying text.
243. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 51 N.Y.2d
679, 417 N.E.2d 78, 435 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1980).
244. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Dutchess Sanitation
Serv. Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670, 417 N.E.2d 74, 435 N.Y.S.2d 962
(1980).
245. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1980); Dutchess
Sanitation Serv. Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 51 N.Y.2d 670, 677, 417 N.E.2d 74, 78,
435 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (1980); Impermissible Isolation, supra note 13, at 333.
246. 437 U.S. 617.
247. Id. at 628.
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V. Conclusion
There are a limited number of appropriate landfill sites. 248  These
must be available to all states and municipalities. Therefore, all mu-
nicipal bans on the importation of intrastate waste should be held
invalid. Few municipalities are either isolated from or independent of
neighboring communities; consequently, unilateral land use decisions
by one municipality affect the needs and resources of an entire re-
gion.2
4 9
The proliferation of solid waste requires a uniform statewide and
regional approach, rather than fragmented municipal action, in order
to achieve effective solid waste control. Municipalities lack the finan-
cial resources, land and expertise to plan, develop and implement
efficient and effective solutions to their solid waste problems. 250 As a
result, uncoordinated municipal refuse disposal activities develop to
meet the immediate needs of local governments. These ineffective
practices create health hazards and pollution problems, and cause the
dissipation of land and other valuable resources, all of which affect
areas larger than a single municipality. 251  Municipalities, therefore,
must work together and each accept their "fair share" 25 2 of refuse,
regardless of its origin, if an effective solution is to be developed.
A statewide and regional approach is the most feasible method of
eliminating environmentally unsound waste disposal practices. The
248. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(6).
249. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 166, 336 A.2d 713, 720 (1975); Golden v.
Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
250. See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text.
251. New Jersey's Options, supra note 63, at 34.
252. Cases illustrating a municipality's power to exclude and prohibit refuse dis-
posal completely from their boundaries can be analogized to exclusionary zoning
cases which have the effect of excluding certain types of housing. In Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), a village restricted its land use to one-family
dwellings excluding lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple
dwelling houses. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the zoning ordinance under the
police power of the state. In Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), the town adopted a land use
plan that restricted the housing growth rate in order to protect its small town
character and surrounding open space. The Ninth Circuit permitted the zoning
restriction since it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. id. at
908-09. In Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), the town had a zoning ordinance excluding low
and moderate income housing. The Supreme Court of New Jersey declared the
ordinance invalid since every municipality must afford the opportunity for decent
and adequate low and moderate income housing at least to the municipality's "fair
share" of the regional need. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. In Golden v. Planning Bd. of
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volume of solid waste produced within a state or region is large
enough to necessitate processing refuse on a larger scale. 253 State and
regional agencies should have exclusive authority to conduct studies to
locate environmentally safe areas within the state or region for the
establishment of sanitary landfills. These agencies should strategically
allocate districts for refuse disposal before they are needed. This
would eliminate the processing and time involved in obtaining munic-
ipal variances and conditional use permits254 and satisfy local interests
in conserving land. States and regions should establish public service
corporations to plan, finance, construct, operate and regulate waste
disposal facilities. 25 5  A state or regional solid waste management
corporation could effectively prevent municipalities from enacting
ordinances excluding or restricting refuse disposal .256
A statewide and regional approach would provide an economic
base for better operational control of waste disposal facilities. Finally,
a state and regional approach is the only viable system to control
parochial opposition while simultaneously educating the public on the
technological advances of solid waste disposal.
Donna R. Lanza
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), the court of appeals held that a municipality may slow
its natural development to "phase in" adequate municipal services, such as water
supply and sewage treatment.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
254. See notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., New Jersey Solid Waste Utility Control Act of 1970, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48:13A-1 to 48:13A-13 (Supp. 1981-82); Rhode Island Solid Waste Manage-
ment Corp. Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-1 to 19-29 (1979 & Supp. 1980).
256. See notes 126-166 supra and accompanying text.
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